Modelling Secure Multiagent Systems by Mouratidis, Haralambos et al.
 
 
 
University of East London Institutional Repository: http://roar.uel.ac.uk  
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please 
scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this 
item and our policy information available from the repository home page for further 
information. 
 
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s): Mouratidis, Haralambos; Giorgini, Paolo; Manson, Gordon. 
Article title: Modelling Secure Multiagent Systems 
Year of publication: 2003 
Citation: Mouratidis, H et al. (2003) ‘Modelling Secure Multiagent Systems’ 
Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and 
multiagent systems AAMAS’03, July 14–18, 2003, Melbourne, Australia pp. 859 - 866 
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/860575.860713    
DOI: 10.1145/860575.860713 
 
Modelling Secure Multiagent Systems  
?
Haralambos Mouratidis 
University of Sheffield  
Computer Science Department 
211 Portobello Street  
S11 4DP, Sheffield, UK 
H.Mouratidis@dcs.shef.ac.uk 
Paolo Giorgini 
University of Trento 
 Department of Information and 
Communication Technology 
Via Sommarive, 14 38050 Povo, Italy 
Paolo.Giorgini@dit.unitn.it
Gordon Manson 
University of Sheffield 
Computer Science Department 
211 Portobello Street 
S11 4DP, Sheffield, UK 
G.Manson@dcs.shef.ac.uk 
 
 
?
?
ABSTRACT  
?
Security plays an important role in the development of 
multiagent systems. However, a careful analysis of software 
development processes shows that the definition of security 
requirements is, usually, considered after the design of the 
system. This is, mainly, due to the fact that agent oriented 
software engineering methodologies have not integrated security 
concerns throughout their developing stages. The integration of 
security concerns during the whole range of the development 
stages could help towards the development of more secure 
multiagent systems. In this paper we introduce extensions to the 
Tropos methodology to enable it to model security concerns 
throughout the whole development process. A description of the 
new concepts is given along with an explanation of how these 
concepts are integrated to the current stages of Tropos. An 
example from the health care sector is used to illustrate the 
above.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
?
Agent Oriented Software Engineering (AOSE) introduces an 
alternative approach in analysing and designing complex 
computerised systems [1,2]. According to AOSE, a complex 
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?characteristics similar to humans such as mobility, and 
intelligence with the capability of communicating.  
 
It has been argued, “if agents are to realise their potential as a 
software engineering paradigm, then it is necessary to develop 
software engineering techniques that are specifically tailored to 
them” [3]. Thus, agent oriented software engineering have been 
developed to one of the most active research areas within the 
agent research community, and many methodologies have been 
developed. However, it is recognised amongst the agent research 
community [1,2] the need of developing a complete 
methodology for analysing and designing multi-agent systems. 
The main role of such a methodology will be to help in all the 
phases of the development of a system, and more importantly, to 
help capture and model the unique characteristics that agent-
oriented systems introduce such as flexibility, autonomous 
problem solving, and the rich interactions between the 
individual agents.  
 
Security plays an important role in the development of 
multiagent systems and is considered as one of the main issues 
to be dealt for agent technology to be widely used outside the 
research community. As a result, research on security for 
Multiagent systems is an important area within the agent 
research community. However, the research has been mainly 
focused on the solution of individual security problems of the 
multiagent systems, such as attacks from an agent to another 
agent, attacks from a platform to an agent, and attacks from an 
agent to a platform. 
 
Only little work has been carried out to integrate security 
concerns into an agent-oriented methodology. Developers of 
agent oriented software engineering methodologies mainly 
neglect security. The common approach towards the inclusion of 
security within a system is to identify security requirements after 
the definition of a system. This approach has provoked the 
emergence of computer systems afflicted with security 
vulnerabilities [4]. From the viewpoint of the traditional security 
paradigm, it should be possible to eliminate such problems 
through better integration of security and systems engineering.  
 
 
 
In this paper, we introduce extensions to the Tropos 
methodology to accommodate security concerns during the 
software development stages.  Section 2 provides an overview of 
how security is usually defined and gives some real facts of 
security failures.  Section 3 describes our approach of 
integrating security and systems engineering in Tropos, by 
describing the modelling features we introduce in our approach, 
and how these are integrated to the current concepts and stages 
of the methodology. In Section 4 we illustrate our approach with 
the aid of an example taken from the health care sector, and in 
Section 5 we present a discussion of related work. Section 6 
presents some concluding remarks and future work.  
2. SECURITY 
Security is usually defined in terms of the existence of any of the 
following properties: 
 
 Confidentiality: The property of guaranteeing 
information is only accessible to authorised 
entities and inaccessible to others 
 Authentication: The property of proving the 
identity of an entity 
 Integrity: The property of assuring that the 
information remains unmodified from source 
entity to destination entity 
 Access Control: The property of identifying the 
access rights an entity has over system resources 
 Non repudiation: The property of confirming the 
involvement of an entity in certain 
communication 
 Availability: The property of guaranteeing the 
accessibility and usability of information and 
resources to authorised entities 
 
Failure of any of the above-mentioned security properties might 
lead to many dangers ranging from financial losses to sensitive 
personal information losses. According to the Computer Crime 
and Security Survey, contacted by the Computer Security 
Institute (CSI) during the first three quarters of 2002, about 
ninety (90) percent of respondents, mainly large US 
corporations and US government agencies, detected computer 
security breaches and eighty (80) percent acknowledged 
financial losses due to those security breaches.   
Security vulnerabilities have also been dramatically increased 
the last few years. According to the CERT Coordination Center1 
while during 1995, 171 vulnerabilities were reported, this 
number increased to 3,222 during the first three quarters of 
2002. In addition, the last 10 years the number of incidents 
reported has increased from 773 (in 1992) to 73,359 (the first 
three quarters of 2002).  
All those figures prove that security is not considered as much 
as it should. A reason for this is that for software developers, 
security interferes with features and time to market. Thus, 
currently the definition of security requirements is usually 
considered after the design of the system. This typically means 
that security enforcement mechanisms have to be fitted into a 
                                                                
1 http://www.cert.org/ 
pre-existing design therefore leading to serious design 
challenges that usually translate into software vulnerabilities.  
The same is true for Multiagent systems. A main reason for this 
situation is that developers of agent-oriented methodologies 
have mainly neglected security. Although, many agent oriented 
methodologies have been developed during the last few years 
[2,5], very little evidence have been reported of methodologies 
that they adequately integrate security and systems engineering 
within their development process. Agent Oriented software 
engineering considers security as a non-functional requirement. 
However, differently than other non-functional requirements, 
such as performance and reliability, the definition of security is 
usually considered after the design of the system.    
We believe that security concerns should be considered during 
the whole development process of a Multiagent system and it 
should be defined together with the requirements specification. 
Taking security requirements into account together with the 
functional requirements of a Multiagent system throughout the 
development stages helps to limit cases of conflict between 
security and system requirements, by identifying them very early 
in the system development, and find ways to overcome them. On 
the other hand, adding security as an afterthought not only 
increases the chances of such a conflict to exist, but it requires 
huge amount of money and valuable time to overcome it, once 
they have been identified (usually a major rebuild of the system 
is needed).  
 
The integration of security concerns within the context of a 
multiagent system will require for the subsystems (agents) of the 
system to consider the security requirements when specifying 
their goals and interactions therefore causing the propagation of 
security requirements to the rest of the subsystems.   
3. SECURE TROPOS  
Tropos [5] is a software development methodology, for building 
agent-oriented software systems, that uses concepts such as 
actors, goals, soft goals, tasks, resources (see figure 1 for 
graphical representation) and intentional dependencies (see 
figure 2a for graphical representation) throughout all the phases 
of the software development [6]. A key feature of Tropos is that 
it pays great deal of attention to the early requirements analysis 
that precedes the specification of the perspective requirements, 
emphasizing the need to understand the how and why the 
intended system would meet the organisational goals.  
 
Figure 1: Graphical Representation of Tropos concepts 
Tropos supports four development stages, namely early and late 
requirements, architectural design, and detailed design. Early 
and late requirements analysis represents the initial phases in the 
Tropos methodology and the final goal is to provide a set of 
functional and non-functional requirements for the system-to-be. 
Both phases, early and late, share the same conceptual and 
methodological approach. This means, that most of the 
techniques used during the early requirements analysis are used 
for the late as well. The main difference is that during the early 
requirements analysis, the developer models the main 
stakeholders of the system and their dependencies, while in the 
late requirements analysis the developer models the system itself 
by introducing it as another actor and model its dependencies 
with the other actors of the organisation. The architectural 
design stage defines the system’s global architecture in terms of 
actors interconnected through data and control flows 
(represented as dependencies). In addition, during this stage the 
actors of the system are mapped into a set of software agents, 
each characterized by its specific capabilities. During the 
detailed design stage, the developer specifies, in detail, the 
agents’ goals, beliefs, and capabilities as well as the 
communication between the agents. For this reason, Tropos 
employs a set of AUML diagrams [7].  
Tropos was not conceived with security in mind and as a result 
it fails to adequately capture security requirements [8]. The 
process of integrating security and functional requirements 
throughout the whole range of the development stages is quite 
ad hoc, and in addition, the concept of soft goal that Tropos uses 
to capture security requirements fails to adequately capture some 
constraints that security requirements often represent [8]. Thus, 
we have extended the Tropos methodology to enable developers 
to adequately capture security requirements. The next section 
describes our extensions and how they have been integrated 
within the Tropos methodology process. 
3.1 The “secure” concepts 
Extra concepts were introduced to the methodology to enable it 
to model security requirements during the software development 
process. These are: 
 
Security Diagram [9], The security diagram represents the 
connection between security features, threats, protection 
objectives, and security mechanisms that help towards the 
satisfaction of the objectives. Security features [9] represent 
security related features that the system-to-be must have. 
Protection objectives [9] represent a set of principles that 
contribute towards the achievement of the security features. 
Threats [9] on the other hand represent circumstances that have 
the potential to cause loss or problems that can put in danger the 
security features of the system, while security mechanisms [9] 
identify possible protection mechanisms of achieving protection 
objectives.   
 
Security Constraint [8], which represents constraints that are 
related to the security of the system. Since, constraints can 
influence the security of the system either positively or 
negatively, we further define positive and negative security 
constraints respectively. An example of a positive security 
constraint could be Allow Access Only to Personal Information, 
while a negative security constraint could be Send Information 
Plain Text (not encrypted).   
 
Secure Entities [8], which represent any secure goals/tasks/ 
resources of the system. Secure goals are introduced to satisfy 
possible security constraints that exist in the system, while 
security tasks represent ways of achieving the introduced 
security goals. A resource that is related to a secure entity or a 
security constraint is considered a secure resource.   
Secure Dependencies [8], represent that a dependency between 
two actors involves the introduction of a security constraint that 
must be satisfied either by the depender, the dependee or both 
for the dependency to be valid. Secure dependencies are 
categorized into depender secure dependency, in which the 
depender introduces security constraints for the dependency and 
the dependee must satisfy the security constraints for the 
dependency to be valid, dependee Secure Dependency, in which 
the dependee introduces security constraints and the depender 
must satisfy them, and double Secure Dependency, in which 
both the depender and the dependee introduce security 
constraints for the dependency that both must satisfy for the 
dependency to be valid. A graphical representation of the 
different types of dependencies is illustrated in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Different types of dependencies 
 
Secure Capabilities, which represent capabilities that the actors 
(agents) of the system must have in order to help towards the 
satisfaction of the security requirements of the system.  
 
3.2 Modelling Activities 
Many different modeling activities contribute to the capture of 
security requirements and their integration within the Tropos 
development process. These are: 
 
Security diagram modelling, which involves the modelling of 
security needs of the system-to-be, problems related to the 
security of the system (such as possible threats and 
vulnerabilities) and possible solutions to the security problems 
(these solutions can usually be identified in terms of a security 
policy that the organisation might have). We have decided to use 
Tropos concepts to capture the concepts of the security diagram. 
This helps to better integrate the security diagram within the 
Tropos methodology and make its concepts easily 
understandable to developers familiar with Tropos. Thus, we are 
using the concept of a soft goal to capture security features. Soft 
goals in Tropos are used to model quality attributes for which 
there are no clear criteria for satisfaction. In the same sense, 
security features are not subject to any clear criteria for 
satisfaction. Protection objectives are represented using the 
concept of a goal, because as goals define desired states of the 
world, protection objectives define desired security states that 
the system must have. To represent security mechanisms we use 
the concept of a task, since as a task represents a way of doing 
something (usually a goal), a security mechanism represents a 
way of achieving a security objective. The following figure 
shows how the above-mentioned concepts can be graphically 
represented. 
 
Figure 3: Security diagram concepts 
 
Security constraint modelling involves the modeling of 
the security constraints imposed to the actors and the system and 
it allows the designer to perform an analysis by introducing 
relationships between the constraints or a constraint and its 
context [9]. Security constraints are imposed by the stakeholders 
(during the early requirements stage) and by the security 
diagram (during the late requirements stage) and are guaranteed 
by assigning capabilities (secure capabilities) to the components 
of the system (i.e. the actors or the agents of it). Stakeholders 
can impose positive and negative security constraints, while the 
constraints imposed by the security diagram are only positive 
security constraints. By imposing security constraints to 
different parts of the system, we are able to identify possible 
conflicts between security and other (functional and non 
functional) requirements of the system, identify (stakeholder) 
constraints that can put in danger the security of the system, and 
propose possible ways towards a design that will integrate 
security and systems engineering leading to the development of 
a more secure system.  A security constraint is represented 
graphically as shown in figure 4.  
 
Secure entities modelling, which is considered as 
complementary to the security constraints modeling. The 
analysis of the secure entities follows the same reasoning 
techniques identified by Tropos for the goal and task analysis 
[10]. Secure Entities are represented by introducing an S within 
brackets (S) before the text description as shown in figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Security constraint and secure entities graphical 
representations 
 
Secure capability modelling, involves the identification of the 
capabilities of the subsystems (actors) to guarantee the 
satisfaction of the security constraints. In order for the system to 
be able to satisfy its goals and the security constraints, the 
system’s agents has to be provided with capabilities. Secure 
Capabilities modelling takes place alongside with the 
capabilities modelling during the architectural design. Secure 
capabilities can be identified by considering dependencies that 
involve secure entities in the extended actor diagram. Later, 
during the detailed design, these capabilities are further 
specified (in terms of plans, etc) and they are coded during the 
implementation stage. 
3.3 Integration to the current Tropos stages 
A difficult but necessary task when extending a methodology is 
to successfully integrate the extensions to the current stages of 
the methodology. In our case, we have integrated the extensions 
as follows:  
Early requirements stage: During the early requirements 
analysis stage the Security Diagram (SD) is constructed and 
security constraints are imposed to the stakeholders of the 
system (by other stakeholders). However, the imposed security 
constraints are expressed in high-level statements, so they are 
furthered analysed [9] and security entities are introduced to 
satisfy them.  
Late requirements stage: During the late requirements stage 
security constraints are imposed to the system-to-be (by the 
security diagram). These constraints are further analysed 
according to the constraint analysis processes [9].  
Architectural design stage: During the architectural design we 
identify the security constraints and secure entities that the new 
actors introduce and also during the actor decomposition we 
identify security sub-constraints and sub-entities. In addition 
secure capabilities are identified and assigned to each agent of 
the system.  
Detailed design stage: We specify the agent capabilities and 
interactions taking into account the security aspects as well. In 
doing so we are using AUML [7] notation in which we 
introduce the tag of security rules.  This is similar to the 
business rules that UML has for defining constraints on the 
diagrams. 
4. AN EXAMPLE 
In this section, we go through the development stages using a 
case study. This case study is part of a real-life system, called 
electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP), under 
development at the University of Sheffield [11]. The electronic 
Single Assessment Process  (eSAP) system is an agent-based 
health and social care system for the effective care of older 
people. To make this example simpler and more understandable, 
we consider a substantial part of the eSAP system.   
4.1 Early Requirements 
Early Requirements stage is concerned with the understanding 
of a problem by studying an existing organisational setting. The 
output of this phase is an organisational model, which includes 
relevant actors and their respective dependencies. In our 
example, we consider the following actors for the eSAP system:  
 Professional: The health and/or social care 
professional 
 Older Person: The Older Person (patient) that wishes 
to receive appropriate health and social care  
 DoH: The English Department of Health 
 R&D Agency: A Research and Development Agency 
interested in obtaining medical information 
 Benefits Agency: An agency that helps the older 
person financially 
Threat
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Figure 7: Professional Actor Partial Analysis 
4.2 Late Requirements 
When all the actors have been analysed, the next phase involves 
the analysis of the system-to-be. During the late requirements 
stage, the system-to-be is analysed within its operation 
environment, along with relevant functions, security concerns 
and qualities. The system is presented as one or more actors, 
who have a number of dependencies with the other actors of the 
organisation. These dependencies define all the functional and 
non-functional requirements of the system. However, in this 
example, we are focusing on the security modeling.  From the 
security point of view, security constraints are imposed to the 
system-to-be (by taking into account the security diagram). 
These constraints are further analysed according to the 
constraint analysis processes [9].   
The main aim of the eSAP system (figure 8) is to Automate Care 
in order to help professionals provide faster and more efficient 
care, and allow on the other hand older people get more 
involved in their care. Taking into consideration the security 
diagram there are two main constraints imposed (by the desired 
security features of the system- privacy and availability) to the 
eSAP’s main goal - Keep Data Private and Keep Data 
Available. For the eSAP to satisfy these constraints two secure 
goals have been identified. Ensure Data Privacy and Ensure 
Data Availability.  
This example focuses only on the Keep Data Private constraint. 
This constraint can be further analysed to sub-constraints Allow 
Only Encrypted Transfer of Data, Allow Only Authorised 
Access, and Allow Access Only to Personal Care Plan. Taking 
into account the security diagram, secure goals are introduced 
to help towards the satisfaction of the imposed security 
constraints. Thus the secure goals Use Cryptography, Check 
Authorisation, Check Access Control, and Check Information 
Flow are introduced.  In addition, some of the secure goals are 
further analysed in terms of secure tasks. 
 
Figure 8: eSAP System Partial Analysis 
Thus, the Use Cryptography goal is divided to two secure tasks 
Encrypt Data and Decrypt Data. Although these tasks could be 
furthered decomposed by indicating for example the type of the 
encryption algorithm this is not the case in this stage, since the 
type of the encryption algorithm depends on the implementation 
of the system and it will restrict the designers of the system in a 
particular implementation style. The Check Authorisation is 
decomposed into four secure tasks, Check Password, Check 
Digital Signatures, Check Biometrics and Call Back. However, 
it is indicated in the diagram that the last two tasks contribute 
negatively towards the mobility of the system, and this is one 
factor that the developers must take into consideration in the 
implementation of the system.     
4.3 Architectural Design 
The architectural design involves the addition of new actors, in 
which new actors are added to make the system interact with the 
external actors; actor decomposition, in which each actor is 
described in detail with respect to their goals and tasks; 
capabilities identification, in which capabilities needed by the 
actors to fulfill their goals are identified; and agent assignment, 
in which a set of agent types is defined and each agent is 
assigned one or more capabilities. From the security point of 
view, we identify the security constraints and secure entities that 
the new actors introduce and also during the actor 
decomposition we identify security sub-constraints and sub-
entities. In addition secure capabilities are identified and 
assigned to each agent of the system.  
As it was derived from the late requirements stage, one of the 
systems secure goals is to “Ensure Data Privacy”. To achieve 
this goal the eSAP depends on the Privacy Manager (Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Actors’ Decomposition Diagram 
The Privacy Manager has four main secure goals, as derived 
from the analysis, (sub-goals to the “Ensure Data Privacy” goal) 
“check authorisation”, “check access control”, “check 
information flow” and “use cryptography”. For achieving these 
goals the Privacy Manager depends on the “Authorisation 
Manager”, “Access Control Manager”, “Information Flow 
Manager” and “Cryptography Manager” respectively. Although 
the other actors of the system can be furthered decomposed, due 
to lack of space, this example focuses only in the privacy 
concerns of the system. For each new actor introduced in the 
system, an extended diagram is required to capture the 
dependencies of the new actor with the already existing actors of 
the system. Figure 10 shows a part (focused on the privacy) of 
the extended diagram for the plan “Access Care Plan Info” of 
the Professional. The Care Plan Manager is responsible for 
providing access at the Professional to “Care Plan Info”. It 
depends on the Authorisation Manager to deal with 
authorisation procedures, on the Access Control Manager and 
the Information Flow Manager to perform access control checks 
and information flow checks respectively, and on the 
Cryptography Manager for encrypting and decrypting 
information. 
The next step in the architectural design is to identify (secure) 
capabilities for each actor. Taking into consideration the 
extended actor diagram (figure 10), each dependency 
relationship can give place to one or more capabilities triggered 
by external events.  The actors along with their capabilities with 
respect to the extended diagram of figure 10 are shown in Table 
1. When the actors along with their capabilities have been 
identified the next step is the agents’ assignment. A set of agent 
types are defined and each one of them is assigned one or more 
different capabilities (Table 2) with respect to the capabilities 
identified in the previous step (Table 1). 
4.4 Detailed Design 
From the security point of view, during the detailed design the 
developers specify the agent capabilities and interactions taking 
into account the security aspects derived from the previous steps 
of the analysis. In doing so AUML notation is employed.  The 
only difference is the introduction of security rules.  These are 
similar to the business rules that UML has for defining 
constraints on the diagrams. 
 
Figure 10: Extended Diagram wrt “Access Care Plan Info” 
task 
 
Table 1: Actors and their Capabilities 
 Actors Capability Cap
. ID 
Professional Provide Care Plan Info Request 1 
 Provide Authorisation Details 2 
 Obtain Care Plan Info 3 
Care Plan Manager Obtain Care Plan Info Request 4 
 Provide Care Plan Info 5 
 Request Encryption of Data 6 
 Obtain Encrypted Data 7 
 Request Decryption of Data 8 
 Obtain Plain Data 9 
 Obtain Authorisation Clearance 10 
 Obtain Access Control Clearance 11 
 Obtain Information Flow 
Clearance 
12 
Cryptography Manager Encrypt Data 13 
 Decrypt Data 14 
Information Flow 
Manager 
Provide Information Flow 
Clearance 
15 
Access Control 
Manager 
Provide Access Control Clearance 16 
Authorisation Manager Obtain Authorisation Details 17 
 Provide Authorisation Clearance 18 
5. RELATED WORK 
As stated in the introduction, very little work has taken place in 
considering security requirements as an integral part of the 
whole software development process. None of the existing agent 
oriented methodologies, to our knowledge, have been 
demonstrated enough evidence to support claims of adequately 
integrate security modeling during the whole software 
development stages. Only recently, some initial steps have been 
taken towards this direction. Eric Yu has initiated work [12] that 
provides ways of modeling and reasoning about non-functional 
requirements (with emphasis on security). Yu is using the 
concept of a soft goal to assess different design alternatives, and 
how each of these alternatives would contribute positively or 
negatively in achieving the soft goal.  
Table 2: Agents and their Capabilities 
Agent Capabilities 
Professional 1,2,3 
Care Plan Agent 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 
Privacy Agent 13,14,15,16,17,18 
Lodderstedt et al present a modeling language, based on UML, 
called SecureUML [13]. Their approach is focused on modeling 
access control policies and how these (policies) can be 
integrated into a model-driven software development process. 
Differently than these two approaches that are focused in 
particular stages of the development (Yu’s effort is focused only 
in the requirements area while Lodderstedt’s work is focused in 
the design stage) our approach covers the whole development 
process. It is important to consider security using the same 
concepts and notations during the whole development process.  
In addition, Huget [14] proposes a new methodology, called 
Nemo and claims that it tackles security. In his approach, 
security is not considered as a specific model but it is included 
within the other models of the methodology. Nemo is a new 
methodology and as such it has not been extensively presented 
on literature. From our point of view, the methodology tackles 
security quite superficial and as the developer states 
“particularly, security has to be intertwined more deeply within 
models” [14]. Thus, more evidence will be required to satisfy 
the claim of the developer that the methodology tackles security.  
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presents results from our work to extend Tropos 
methodology to enable it to consider security requirements 
throughout its development stages. During the process of 
extending Tropos some very useful observations were obtained. 
First of all, the concept of constraints is a natural extension of 
the Tropos methodology and it allows for a systematic approach 
towards the modelling of security requirements. This is because, 
although functional and security requirements are defined 
alongside, a clear distinction is provided. Secondly, the security 
diagram allows identifying desired security requirements very 
early in the development stages, and helps to propagate them 
until the implementation stage, introducing a security-oriented 
paradigm to the software process. In addition, the iterative 
nature of the methodology, allows the re-definition of security 
requirements in different levels therefore providing a better 
integration with system functionality. 
 
However, this in an ongoing research and more work is required 
to achieve our aim, which is to provide a well guided process of 
integrating security and functional requirements throughout the 
software development process of agent-based systems, using the 
same concepts and notations throughout the process. Currently 
we are working on refining the identified concepts, notations, 
and the process, and we are integrating our extensions to the 
Formal Tropos [6] specification language. This will enable us to 
formally evaluate our extensions, since Formal Tropos is 
amenable to formal analysis. 
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